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The еconomic and financial integration of Bulgaria to the European 
Union (EU) since the start of its official membership in 2007 
coincided with the worst Global financial and economic crisis for the 
last seven decades and with the European sovereign crisis in the 
European Moneraty Union (EMU) as the “core’ of the EU 
integration. The paper discusses the adjustment of the Bulgarian 
economy to the integration process in the EU which has been 
challenged by the deep institutional reform process as crucial for 
overcoming the crisis by making the normative power of the EU 
stronger. The macroeconomic performance of Bulgaria is revealed 
with regard to the compliance with the macroeconomic convergence 
criteria for the EMU. The financial sector reform is discussed to 
outline its ongoing reform with the EU law and regulation. 
Conclusions are summarized for the EMU’s entry as a challenge and 
opportunity for further integration of Bulgaria the EU. 
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In the ten-year period from the conclusion of the Treaty of Accession 
of Bulgaria to the EU on April 25, 2005 until present the most 
important place in the adaptation of the economy to the European 
integration is the implementation of anational integration policy in 
favour of economic development and preparation for inclusion in the 
Economic and Monetary Union. Macroeconomic nominal 
convergence with the EU framework for admittance to the EMU is 
held both in terms of the strategy of "catching up" and efforts for 
overcoming the gap in socio-economic development to the old 
member states of the EU. Another main trend is the Bulgarian 
economy’s marketization as becoming a part of the European single 
market through the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
work force on the basis of introduction the EU law and regulation , i.e. 
the acquis communitaire. 
 
The proposed analysis in this study is based on the concept that EU 
integration can be distinguished from other factors of economic 
development under certain assumptions as regards the channels of 
transmission the Union’s policies to the economic governance. The 
main strengths and weaknesses of the current membership of Bulgaria 
in the EU confirm that the EU as a normative power has played the 
role of an “anchor” of the transformation process in Bulgaria as well 
as in the other former centrally planned countries that have joined the 
EU. The concept of the Europeanisation for these countries has 
become equivalent to their EU-ization - a term introduced by Helen 
Wallace, an extinguished British professor in European studies at the 
start of the pre-accession stage (Wallace, 2001). The "EU-ization," as 
defined by the acquis communautaire, has become the chosen 
instrument for hastening the process of   transformation from centrally 
planned to market economy.1 Due to the fact that the EU itself has 
                                           
1 The Europeanization described as a behavioural and institutional change transfer 
from Europe to other jurisdictions either of policy, institutional arrangements, rules, 
beliefs or norms, and secondly as capacity building in Europe, which also involves a 
transfer of policy, institutional arrangements, rules, beliefs or norms. (See: 
Flockhart,T. (2010) Europeanization or EU-ization? The Transfer of European 
Norms across Time and Space. JCMS 2010 Volume 48. Number 4. pp. 787–810.) 
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been undergoing deep changes of its regulative power during the last 
decade the impact of the EU-ization has brought challenges that lie 
ahead before the integration process of deepening and widening of the 
EU.(Wallace, 2014). By drawing attention to the ongoing changes in 
the Bulgarian economy, our goal is to present the main results and 
changes that emerge to some extent under the impact of EU 
integration not as regulatory change but as a reflection of its impact on 
economic interdependence between the Bulgarian economy and the 
status of the EU at present.  
 
For Bulgaria the preparation for the EMU has been inseparable part of 
the engagements of joining the EU in 2007. This issue presents in a 
concise form the embedded problems of the new EU member states as 
regards their efforts in the “the catching up” process of development 
in order to integrate.There seems always to be a “gap” that is a 
challenge to overcome as the rapid changes in the EU as a political 
actor and as normative power re-regulating the institutional order 
create new problems to be encountered especially by new member 
states like Bulgaria. 
 
Such an example may be considered the process of preparation for the 
adoption of the euro which is ongoing. In the pre-accession period 
until 2007 the common view has prevailed among scholars and 
politicians in Bulgaria that the time of the adoption of the euro should 
be as soon as possible after the date of the country's accession to the 
European Union, namely in the second half of 2009 or on 1 January 
2010 at the latest. This view has been completely consistent with the 
common position of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers and the 
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) as stated officially on November 25 
of 2004. It has been laid down as a goal in the 2004 Strategy of 
Bulgaria to prepare to join the European System of the Central banks 
and the ERM-II immediately after accession as intermediate stage of 
the EMU (BNB, 2004). The BNB declared the commitment to act 
within the current Currency board framework until its full euro area 
and Eurosystem membership. During the pre-accession period of 
Bulgaria until 2007 two main prerequisites have been looked upon as 
providing good grounds to expect to join the EMU sooner upon 
accession: the Currency board providing monetary stability and the 
fiscal consolidation providing stability of the public finance.  
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Since the accession to the EU in 2007 the Currency Board 
arrangement (CBA) has been considered to be an opportunity for 
achieving Bulgaria’s compliance with one of the Maastricht criteria 
concerning the two years adherence to the fixed official rate of the 
Bulgarian currency (the BGL) to the Euro before joining the EMU. 
Bulgaria has been under CBA since 1997 and it’s maintainance of the 
fixed rate to the Euro has been preserved automatically so far.2 The 
compatibility of the CBA with the requirements for an ERM-II 
membership has been considered a logical consequence for raising the 
expectations for its entry. The expectations for Bulgaria’s entry in the 
ERM-II have been based on the good record of public finances and the 
sustainability of the CBA.The EU-ization of Bulgaria’s public 
finances has started during the pre-accession period and continued 
further when the country received an EU membership since the 1st Of 
January 2007. The EU requirements to converge to the Maastricht 
criteria have become crucial for preparation of the EMU entry.  
 
At the time of the EU entry this has been considered in Bulgaria an 
achievable medium term goal on the basis of successful 
macroeconomic performance since 2001 involving: higher economic 
growth rates, creating fiscal reserves and reducing the debt-GDP ratio 
in the preaccession period. However Bulgaria has not been admitted to 
the ERM-II as expected. In the Convergence report for 2008 the stress 
is laid on Bulgaria’s non-fulfillment of the price stability criterion and 
the build-up of some external imbalances highlights the fact that the 
temporary fulfilment of the numerical convergence criteria is, by 
itself, not enough for admission to the euro area.  
 
As the Global crisis, followed by the European sovereign crisis since 
2010, evolved in the EU deep change in the EMU and in the overall 
process of EU economic governance have occurred. The initiial design 
of the EMU and its overall functioning from its first decade of 
existence have been put under the pressure of the crisis management. 
This has had an important impact on the overall approach to the 
institutional characteristics of the EMU with inevitable consequences 
                                           
2 The Currency Board in general provides an even stronger peg of the BGL to the 
Euro. Thus for Bulgaria until 2009 the entry into the ERM-II has not been 
considered to be problematic after the accession to the EU. 
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both for the “ins”countries of EMU as well as for the “outs”,i.e.the EU 
member states like Bulgaria preparing for EMU entry.    
 
Since 2015 Bulgaria’s preparation for the EMU entry has been given 
again due attention by the Bulgarian Government. But now this 
priority has to be considered with regard to the EU strategy of 
deepening of the EMU as a Monetary, Banking and Capital Union 
(Completing the Union, 2015). There is a need to conceive that the 
EMU has acquired new institutional and regulatory features that raise 
the requirements for the preparation to enter and adjust to it as a 
regular member country of the EU. The hypothesis is discussed that 
the delay of Bulgaria’s joining the EMU may present a challenge of 
higher costs of compliance to the more advanced form of 
“differentiated integration” of EMU in the EU and its institutional 
architecture.3  
 
The analysis comprises two aspects of discussion of the present issues 
of Bulgaria’s economic and financial integration To the EMU. The 
first part discusses the macroeconomic performance of Bulgaria with 
focus on the public finances’s compliance with the Maastricht criteria 
as required framework for convergence to the EMU. The second part 
presents the reforms in the financial sector of Bulgaria as an ongoing 
further adjustment to the requirements for the EMU entry.  
 
 
2. THE MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF 
BULGARIA IN 2007- 2015 AND ITS COMPLIANCE WITH 
THE MAASTRICHT CRITERIA 
 
The issues of the entry criteria for the EMU as a set of Maastricht 
criteria from its initial period raise a number of questions about the 
proper “fitness” of a country to comply. As regards the set of 
Maastricht criteria of convergence for example, Kozluk (2005, p. 439-
474) finds that some of the EU accession countries are better prepared 
                                           
3 As stated in the Article1(3)Treaty of European union(TEU) and  the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union within or outside the Treaties of the EU in the 
field of European economic  and monetary policy the differentiated integration is the 
cooperation of some but not all EU member states. 
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for the single currency membership than some of the more established 
members had been at the introduction of the EMU.The differentiation 
between the strictness of Maastricht criteria for EMU entry, on one 
hand and the reconsidered since 2005 framework of the Stability and 
Growth pact applied to member states of the EMU allowing flexibility 
to adapt has been considered with regard to some recommendations 
for unification of fiscal deficits requirements for both EU members 
and the EMU entry (Nuti, 2006).  
 
But the compliance with the fiscal sustainability criteria has gained 
new aspects of importance as the present European sovereign debt 
crisis has evolved since 2010. As previewed by Mongelli (2002, p.34) 
the costs from negative external effects have become “very high for 
the EMU because not one, but more, member countries”were to run 
sizeable and protracted budget deficits, accumulating an unsustainable 
public debt, eventually some pecuniary externalities might ripple 
through the currency area.“ The compliance with the nominal and real 
convergence indicators of a EU member state in the preparation for 
the EMU entry remains crucial. As the recent Global crisis and 
European sovereign crisis have hit hard the Central and East European 
countries and the recovery so far has not been good enough (in spite 
of significant differences among countries) the questions about the 
growth model through deepening integration have been raised again. 
The EU membership could not facilitate much the catch-up model of 
growth due to the crisis implications though there are many 
differences among the growth performance of the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The integration to the EU is important as it 
supports sound fiscal and financial policies in the new member states 
by the strengthening of the EU’s current macro-finance assistance 
arrangements and economic governance improvements. However the 
role of proper fiscal policy becomes more important not only as 
instrumental for the EMU entry but because it has to take account of 
the need to stimulate economic growth. (Becker et al., 2010).  
 
The fiscal vulnerability often arises from implicit liabilities towards 
the financial sector and for this reason sustainability assessments 
should also consider private-sector fragility. EU countries’ budgets 
have been involved with providing great amounts of state aid to rescue 
banks and non-financial intermediaries. The post crisis institutions 
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newly created to tackle the financial instabiliy provide new capacities 
for of the EMU. Thus for the EU member states like Bulgaria that are 
‘outs’ to the EMU it is important to join the EMU as it may help 
growth by joining new cooperation agreements that are targeted to 
increase financial stability.  The implementation of the Banking and 
Capital Union could contribute to the break of the vicious circle 
between the public debt and banking sector’s debt and improve the 
fiscal consolidation in favour of the EMU (Zimmermann, 2015).  
 
During the last decade, Bulgaria has achieved macroeconomic 
stability and positive GDP growth. The economic growth for the 
period (2000-2008) has been kept on stable upward track record due 
to the increased aggregate supply and consumption, fiscal 
consolidation, the foreign capital inflows as a substantially increased 
external source of finance and the maintenance of the monetary 
discipline through the sustainability of the Currency Board since 1997. 
GDP growth rate for the period (2005-2008) has averaged annually 
6.4%. Compared to other EU member states Bulgaria has experienced 
since the start of the new millennium high rates of economic growth 
which have raised the expectations as well as doubts for the continuity 
of the “catch up” type of growth after joining the EU (Angelov, 2006). 
The growth of domestic and foreign capital investments has been 
concentrated predominantly in construction, real estate, tourism and 
services which contributed to overheating the economy. During the 
period 2005-2008, Bulgaria's GDP grew by a relatively rapid pace but 
in 2009, due to the impact of the Global economic crisis  the GDP 
contracted by 5% and a slowdown of economic growth followed 
(Figure 1). 
 
Since 2010 began a gradual recovery of the Bulgarian economy, but at 
a very slow pace. In 2010, growth was only 0.7%, in 2011 rose to 2% 
and in 2012 was only 0.2%. In 2013 and 2014 the economic growth 
remained rather modest at the rate respectively of 1.1 and 1.7%. For 
achieving the pre-crisis level of growth it has taken five years. In 2015 
the rate of growth has increased to 2.9% and higher rate of about 3% 





Figure 1. The Annual Rate of Growth of the GDP of Bulgaria (for 
(2002 -2014) (market prices, %) 
 
Source: European Commission (Eurostat) National accounts of 
Bulgaria. 
 
Macroeconomic performance has allowed to maintain stability but the 
rate of growth has remained low in recent years. The unsatisfactory 
growth record has been accornpanied by relatively modest fiscal 
deficits, low inflation and a stable currency. Growth has been deprived 
of new capital inflows from abroad as direct and portfolio investments 
have fallen considerably as result of the Global and the European 
sovereign crisis. The economic growth has become largely dependent 
on domestic factors and only to some extent driven mainly by growth 
in services and manufacturing, the latter aided by an expansion in 












Figure 2. EU Member States: GDP per capita at current market prices, 
2003 and 2013(¹)  
(EU-28 = 100; based on PPS per inhabitant)  
 
 
The need of raising growth is considered a necessary prerequisite to 
diminish the gap between the GDP per capita of Bulgaria and the 
average GDP per capita of EU-28. Bulgaria records the lowest level of 
this indicator among the EU Member States as its GDP per capita 
amounts to 53% below the EU average, Besides Bulgaria has achieved 
a very small increase of the GDP per capita from 2003 to 2013 
compared to other EU countries. This indicator reflects the need of 
structural policies to raise the incomes’ level and national wealthfare 
by economic growth that has to allow for better real convergence with 
the EMU (Graph.1). 
 
The European commitments of Bulgaria for macroeconomic 
convergence with EMU are an integral part of the Accession Treaty to 
the EU. With the efforts for the implementation of Maastricht criteria 
for EMU Bulgaria has achieve progress towards macroeconomic 
nominal convergence (criterion on price stability, sound public 
finances, exchange rate, short-term and long-term interest rates).  
 
The price stability has been a target of the Bulgarian Government and 
central bank’s policies since the pre-accession period.  
 
For the period (2004-2008) the price criterion was not accomplished 
as the inflation was higher than the referent value threshold. The 
structural readjustment and credit expansion related to the higher rates 
of growth caused higher rates of inflation in the period (2004-08). The 
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economic decline has caused a reversal of this trend since 2009 
onwards by the recorded relatively stable process of deflation ( Fig.2).  
 
The domestic factors contributed to higher average inflation until 
mid2009 included: adjustments in administratively regulated prices, 
the harmonisation of excise duties with EU levels by increasing them 
in several stages upon and after joining the EU, oligopolistic type of 
the markets for a number of goods and services etc. The group of 
goods and services with administratively controlled prices had a 
positive contribution to overall annual inflation in contrary to the 
deflationary trends. 
 
The external factors play a role in the domestic price formation due to 
the high openness of the Bulgarian economy and the high degree of 
import dependencies that exercise relatively big influence of the 
import prices. These prices rose steeply in 2004-2008 but recorded a 
steep annual decrease of 14% in 2009. Energy and food prices have 
been a major component of imported inflation especially if it is taken 
in consideration that these commodities have large share of the 
Bulgarian basket of the Harmonised index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP).  
 
Their influence on the price level in Bulgaria is big as after the fall of 
the international prices of oil, energy resources and foods has been 
reflected in the deflationary trends in Bulgaria. After the average  
monthly inflation became negative in August 2013, the decline in 
consumer prices on an annual basis accelerated in 2014, and the 
decrease in HICP at the year-end amounted to 2%. The average annual 
inflation rate for 2013 was also negative at -1.6. The sharp fall in 
inflation in 2009 was partly a result of lower commodity prices and 
the contraction in economic activity. In 2010 and 2011 the inflation 
gradually picked up again, to 3 and 3.4% respectively, largely 
reflecting a increase of the commodity prices and increases in the 
excise duty on tobacco, foods, etc. and the deflation trends from 
abroad further decline in the rate of inflation. The deflation continued 
in 2015 creating risks of deepening of the deflationary trends (Figure 
2). 
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Figure 3. Inflation in Bulgaria: Overall Index HICP 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2015 (Bulgaria – HICP – Overall index, Annual rate 
of change, Eurostat, Neither seasonally nor working day adjusted, 
Unit Percentage). 
 
The historically low level of inflation (within the range of -0.8 to 
0.9%) in 2013 has been considered in the Convergence Report of 2014 
as building risks of increasing inflation in Bulgaria (ECB, 2014). Such 
a forecast has not come true in 2015 least but not last because of the 
ongoing fall of the international prices of food, oil and energy 
resources. During 2014 a stable process of deflation was observed as 
half of  the dynamics of consumer prices went in decline. After 
inflation became negative in August 2013, the decline in consumer 
prices on an annual basis accelerated in 2014, and the decrease in 
HICP at the year-end amounted to 2%. The average annual inflation 
rate for 2014 was also negative at -1.6%.  The annual average 
inflation, measured by CPI, in the last 12 months (January - December 
2015) compared to the previous 12 months (January - December 
2014) was -0.1%. The deflation continued in 2015 and at annual basis 
in December 2015 compared to December 2014 was -0.9 %. The 
official forecast in the Convergence Pogramme of Bulgaria for the 
period 2015-2018 (MoF,2015) previews negative inflation trends to be 
replaced by a rather moderate rate of inflation for 2016 (HICP being 
1,6% to 2% on annual basis) (MoF, 2015). The main risks of further 
deflationary trends remain due to the uncertainty of the medium term 
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trends of international prices of crude oil, gas, services and foods. At 
the same time, a delayed recovery of domestic demand may alsol limit 
increases in prices of goods and services.  
 
But as regards the adoption of the euro the problem of the pro-
inflationary factors and their evaluation is an important issue of the 
forecast of medium and long term inflation trends and the ongoing 
readjustment of the Bulgarian economy to the global trends. Many 
new EMU countries have experienced a rise of inflation after joining 
the EMU.In a monetary union, there are a number of factors that 
exercise upward pressures on inflation and due to this inflation may 
become self-sustained and give rise to an abrupt adjustment. Since the 
nominal interest rate is fixed at the union level, any shock bringing 
inflation above the union average will reduce the real interest rate and 
fuel further inflationary pressures, in a self-reinforcing mechanism for 
instance by stimulating credit expansion.  
 
However, also being out of the EMU has its risk of adverse impact of 
the pro-inflationary trends through the channels of imported inflation. 
These risks may be even higher for a country that is ou of the EMU if 
one takes into consideration the exchange rate risks related to impact 
of the import prices in euros and import prices in US dollars. A rising 
euro in the first halfof 2014 added to the growing world deflationary 
impact. The depreciation of the euro in the second half of 2014 was a 
prerequisite for limiting deflation in some groups of goods, such as 
manufactured goods and food.  
 
The expected slow- down of the deflation rate and the reversal of the 
trend in 2016 r may be due to the higher international prices in EUR  
terms, as a result of the depreciation of the Euro against the US dollar. 
This will compensate for the expected price decrease of the main 
groups of commodities in dollars.  
 
These interdependences underline the role of structural and price 
realignment that Bulgaria has still to undergo in order to join the 
EMU.The main approach to circumvent higher inflationary trends by 
domestic policies is further diminishing the administratively regulated 
prices, increase market competition and stimulate aggregate supply 
and investments by carrying out structural reforms.   
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As a factor that has an impact on the level of inflation may be 
regarded the money market interest rates and the long term interest 
rates. As seen on Fig.3 the money market interest rates in Bulgaria 
have followed the trend of the macroeconomic adjustment since 2006 
by passing through higher level of rising the price of credit  during the 
deepening of the Global crisis and European sovereign crisis which 
placed pressure on the market liquidity. 
 
Figure 3.Money market interest rates in Bulgaria in (2000-2015) (3 
months (80-100 days) maturity, denominated in Bulgarian lev) 
 
Source: Eurostat, NSI of Bulgaria: Money market interest rates  
 
In the post crisis period the slowdown of the Bulgarian economy was 
combined with the availability of savings attracted as deposits and 
thus the own banking resources have increased in supply.  This trend 
combined with the fall of the demand for new credits has caused 
accelerated slowdown of interest rates. This is also an inseparable part 
of the overall deflationary trends since 2009 onwards.  
 
Another indicator influencing the inflation and inflation expectations 
is the criterion of convergence of the long term interest rates on the 
Bulgarian Government debt. The level of these interest rates is 
indicative for the convergence with the EMU as Bulgaria has had 
average long-term interest rates that were – to different degrees in 
separate year – much below the reference value for the interest rate 
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convergence criterion since 2010. As seen on Fig.4, the long term 
interest rates on the Bulgarian Government securities have fallen 
considerably which may also be a factor to lessen the pro-inflationary 
impact of both servicing the debt as well as resorting to issuance of 
new debt. 
 
Figure 5. Bulgaria, Long-term interest rate for convergence purposes 
 
Source: Eurostat, National accounts statistics. 
 
The low inflation rate in Bulgaria will be challenging in the medium 
term, given the limited scope for active monetary policy under the 
existing currency board arrangement Due to the fact that the GDP per 
capita in Bulgaria is significantly lower than in the euro area, it is 
difficult to foresee the exact size of the inflation effect resulting from 
the structural adjustment that is underway. On the Government agenda 
is to introduce an increase of the minimal wage from 2016 onwards as 
well as the liberalisation of the market for electric supplies which may 
cause higher inflation.In medium term the economy is expected to 
grow at a higher rate and as the income convergence proceeds, price 
level convergence is to continue. The outcome will depend also on the 
choice of the model of growth of the Bulgarian economy (Minasijan, 
2011).  This, in turn, would manifest itself in terms of higher domestic 
inflation, given the fixed nominal exchange rate..  
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As a new EU member state Bulgaria has no opt-out choice as regards 
the EMU and thus has the status of a Member State with a derogation. 
The convergence with the EMU requirements has been most pertinent 
by the gradual process of alignment of Bulgaria’s fiscal policy with 
EU requirements.Objectively the economic growth in terms of 
positive rates since 2004 has made possible to maintain the public 
finances adequately and to achieve a budget surplus since 2004 up to 
2009. At the same time complex political and economic reasons 
justify the postponement of Bulgaria's participation in ERM II as the 
Convergence report points out to the need of decreasing the external 
imbalances and improve the laboour market. In practice, the 
deterioration of the indicator for government deficit for 2009 up to 
4.3% of the GDP led to the imposition by the European Commission 
to Bulgaria a procedure for excessive deficit (see Figure 5). In the 
subsequent years, and currently by adhering to the new rules and 
requirements to the government finances, Bulgaria has again restored 
the compliance with Maastricht criterion by adhering to consolidation 






















Figure 5. Government Budget deficit (-) or sufitsit (+) of Bulgaria (% 
of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2015. Data for 2015-2016 are estimates. 
 
In fact after a temporary deterioration in the budget deficit in 2009 
there was a relatively rapid return to a trend of improving 
macroeconomic behavior in accordance with the Maastricht criteria. 
This has been set as a target in the Government fiscal policy also for 
2015-2016. The Convergence Programme of Republic of Bulgaria for 
2014-2018. 
 
As regards the indicator for an average annual rate of growth of the 
public debt-to-GDP  Bulgaria has had consistently consolidated its 
fiscal policy throughout the period (1998-2015) and fiscal discipline 
has been much strict if compared with other EU countries (figure 6). 
The need to provide state aid to meet the needs of the deposit 
guarantees repayments after the closure of Corporate commercial bank 
and the liquidity support for other 2 domestic banks in crisis has 
caused rapid increase of the Government debt-to-GDP ratio in 
2014.The steep rise of this ratio in 2014 caused the assessment of 
Bulgaria as a country with imbalances by the European Commission’s 
Alert mechanism for greater macroeconomic imbalances. By end of 
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December 2015 the government debt-to-GDP ratio is 26.4%, with the 
share of domestic government debt being 8.5% and of external 
government debt – respectively equal to 17.9% of GDP. In the 
government debt structure, domestic debt at the end of 2015 amounts 
to 32.1%, and external debt - to 67.9% of the total debt. Any further 
rise of this indicator for the Government debt may present a challenge 
to fiscal policy sustainability. 
 
The debt-to-GDP ratio is subject to the threshold of the Maastricht 
criteria on public debt..In spite of inceasing the government debt-to-
GDP-ratio Bulgaria is still much below the reference value of the 60% 
of GDP which is the threshold of this criterion of Maastricht.The 
comparison with other EU member states, including EMU member 
states shows that Bulgaria’s debt is below the reference value. (Figure 
6). 
 
Another feature is the structure of this Government debt as being 
issued and sold abroad and in the country. The currency composition 
in which the Government debt has been issued is indicative for the 
high degree of Bulgaria’s euroization.The debt currency structure as 
of end-December 2015 is as follows:  75.9% in EUR, 23.0% in BGN, 
0.6% in USD and 0.4% in other currencies. As regards the currency 
composition of payments, since the beginning of 2015 the greatest is 
the euro-denominated share - 65.5%, followed by those in USD - 













Figure 6. Comparison of EU countries in Maastricht criterion indicator 
for share of public debt in GDP (%) 
 
 
The achieved good discipline in government finances of Bulgaria 
deserves to be acknowledged. As seen in Graph 2, Bulgaria’s indicator 
for share of public debt in GDP is below the threshold of 60% of GDP 
– less than 30% of the GDP. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the 
unfavourable conditions of  the European sovereign crisis in the Euro 
area countries have lasted longer than expected,  there is an objective 
necessity to take account of the need to implement the reforms in the 
EU that are targeted to deepen the integration capacity of the EMU.  
 
The EMU has undergone important institutional and functional changes 
while the euro area tackles the crisis and reforms its policies and 
institution. It is acknowledged that the “in-or-out” of the EMU is a 
question that has become more complex (Rehn, 2013). The design of 
the EMU reforms is still shaping due to the different approaches of the 
member states to the issues and the political process (Ville et al., 2015). 
Surely the present state of the EMU (as considered to be “EMU 2.0.”) 
raises the requirements and the mechanisms and instruments for a 
higher degree of common system of sharing the burden of making the 
EMU a more effective and robust functioning Union. 
 
The costs of entering the EMU have grown as a result of the post 
crisis reforms in the financial integration not only due to enhanced 
needs of compliance with new legal provisions. The differentiated 
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integration within the EMU gives solid grounds for better access of 
the EMU member states to the new institutions for sharing the risks 
and costs of financial integration and its new modalities. The 
challenge is that the EMU is at a stage to be completed by common 
policies to ensure a well-functioning monetary union. The problem is 
to access the implications of the “shift from rules to institutions” in the 
EMU in order to accomplish completely the Monetary Union. For the 
future enlargement of the EMU the differentiated integration will play 
a very important role. Bulgaria’s preparation for the EMU has to take 
into consideration the fiscal capacity’s needs to join the EMU in its 
present state of EMU 0.2.  
 
4. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMS IN THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR  
 
The financial sector of Bulgaria has undergone important changes 
since the accession to the EU in 2007. In compliance with the EU law 
for the banking and nonbanking activities regulation has been 
introduced to implement the Single market for the financial services 
and the accession to the European financial space. There are economic 
reasons to deepen the financial integration of Bulgaria at present on 
the basis of the level of the achieved forms of penetration of the 
investments from the EU.  
 
One one side, the Bulgarian banking system is characterised by the 
predominance of foreign banks which are subsidiaries of EU banking 
groups.Their market share is 73 percent  while  less than a quarter of 
the market share (23 percent) is held by domestic banks. 
Approximately a quarter of the market share, 24 percent, is held by 
Greek-owned subsidiary banks. Altogether there are 28 banks in 
Bulgaria (excluding one recently failed bank), of which 6 are 
branches. Banking establishments from outside of the EU represent 
less than 1.5 percent of the banking system. 
 
On the other side, the foreign direct investments from the EU present 
the biggest share of the total inflow of FDU in Bulgaria traditionally 
but especially since the end of the 90s when the privatization began. 
The abrupt fall of FDI as a result of the Global and European 
sovereign crisis in the period 2009-2012 has had a very negative effect 
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on the Bulgarian economy and is indicative of the complementarities 
that have already being created with partners from the EU (Figure 7). 
 
 In assessment of the impact of the European financial crisis on the 
Bulgarian banking system one may distinguish two periods of 
structural adjustment of the financial sector as follow-up of Bulgaria’s 
accession to the EU.  
 
Figure 7. FDI from the EU as %  from the total FDI in Bulgaria (flow 




Under the conditions of the Global crisis and its impact on the 
European banks the BNB as central bank of Bulgaria introduced 
important anti-crisis measures to support the liquidity management of 
the banks. 4 Bulgaria has harmonised its legislation with the EU law 
that has been urgently introduced in 2008 as regards the deposit 
insurance schemes. In compliance with the EU regulation the 
                                           
4 On November, 27, 2008, the BNB Governing Council adopted amendments to 
Ordinance No. 21 on the minimum required reserves maintained by banks with the 
central bank: (i) effective December 1, 2008, the minimum required reserves on all 
attracted funds of the banks are decreased from 12 percent to 10 percent; 
(ii) effective January 1, 2009, the minimum required reserves on funds attracted by 
the banks from abroad decreased from 10 percent to 5 percent; and (iii) effective 
January 1, 2009, no minimum required reserves is imposed on funds attracted from 
the state and local government budgets. 
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threshold for the deposit schemes guarantee has been raised and 
Bulgaria’s Central bank has joined the Vienna initiative of the Central 
banks of the new EU member states.5 The banks’ capital cushions 
have been kept adequate compared to other European countries: the 
average capital ratio for the system is reportedly close to one quarter 
above the regulatory minimum at around 16%.  
 
Since the beginning of the Global crisis there is a deterioration in the 
portfolios of commercial banks with the growth of non-performing 
loans (amounting to 20% of total volume of bank loans in 2011, 
respectively 18.1% in 2014), This increase has mainly been in 
unsecured consumer loans, while mortgages and credits for 
corporations have not shown a sharp increase. Banks that were more 
aggressive in their lending experienced the largest increase in non-
performing loans.The crisis has made necessary for the banks to be 
more selective in the assessment of the creditability of the clients and 
to improve substantially the risk management.  
 
The overall negative impact of the post-crisis slow recovery of the 
world and European economy contributes to the uncertainty in the 
business climate in Bulgaria and the low demand of new loans and 
investments. The most significant decline is observed as regards loans 
to non-financial institutions, which reflects the ongoing economic 
stagnation in the real sector. This decrease is to some extent a 
reflection of depleted debt capacity of companies in the real sector for 
new loans. This has also confirmed the trend that along with the sharp 
reduction in new loans is observed decrease in deposits of non-
financial institutions. To a lesser degree, but continuing trend is the 




                                           
5The Bulgarian Deposit Insurance Fund (BDIF) is a legal entity established by the 
1998 Law on Bank Deposit Guarantee. The Fund protects depositors’ funds in banks 
up to BGN 196,000 (EUR 100.000) as well as creditors’ interests in bank 




Figure 7. Annual growth rate of banks’ loans to non-financial 
institutions in Bulgaria (in%) 
 
Source: Eurostat. Bulgaria, MFIs excluding ESCB reporting sector - 
Loans, Total maturity, All currencies combined - Domestic (home or 
reference area), Non-Financial corporations sector, Annual growth 
rate, data Neither seasonallynor working day adjusted. 
 
Overall dominant trends in bank lending reflect also the deflationary 
trends that  contribute to lowering the interest rates on deposits and to 
a smaller extent on credits. The risk of deflation and the reduction of 
demand are negatively influencing the business expectations and thus 
add up to the credit crunch. On the one hand, companies are reluctant 
to draw new credits and investment loans; on the other hand, 
households are limited to demand for new loans mainly as already 
have high exposure to servicing debt and current spending. mortgage 
loans since 2008, also  
 
Despite the growth of deposits of savings in the banking system 
(nearly 10% annual growth in deposits of non-financial legal entities 
and individuals and households) there is not an increase in loan 
demand and new loans. Increased liquidity of the banks makes easier 
the drastic decline of interest rates on deposits. In the presence of the 
growth of deposits in the banks the competition increased among the 
banks. The fact is that in conditions of global crisis the growth of 
domestic savings allow to avoid adverse effects of certain reduction of 
cross-border lending liquidity resourcesfrom abroad for subsidiary 
foreign banks in Bulgaria. This reflects the general trend observed in 
the global economy, i.e. by increasing the role of domestic savings as 
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a possible source of credit resources of banks to stimulate the 
credit.(IMF, 2015). There is a process of reduction of interest rates on 
deposits, which since mid-2014 has accelerated across the banking 
system. The growth of deposits  testifies to the sinking aggregate 
demand  of goods and services and risks of  the deflationary trends. 
The consequence of these trends is a small reduction of the net interest 
revenues from loans to banks and to a less extent the reduction of the 
net revenues from commercial credits.(Figure 8) 
 
Figure 8. The structure of the revenues of the banking sector in 
Bulgaria (in % of total revenues) 
 
 
Under these conditions the transposition of important EU directives in 
the banking sector of Bulgaria is inevitably associated with substantial 
changes which are to contribute to the preparation for the EMU entry. 
 
Due to the need to introduce newly Capital Requirements Directive 
and a Regulation on the capital requirements serious changes were 
made to the Credit Institutions Act and in the secondary legislation. 
For example,a fundamental change is the elimination of Ordinance № 
9 of BNB, which lays down specific provisions for credit risk. In place 
of the appropriations to the change in the legal framework specific 
provisions, banks should carry out additional accounting provisions in 
International Financial Reporting Standards, aimed at reduction of the 
carrying value of loans in arrears over 90 days. All these changes have 
a particular impact on individual credit institutions at home and mid-
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term will lead to a further deepening of the process of harmonization 
of regulatory changes in the European financial space.  
 
The recent changes to the EU framework have, however,limited some 
flexibility of the supervisory department of the BNB. Previously the 
BNB applied a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 12 percent, but this 
requirement is now capped at 8 percent under the Capital 
Requirements Regulation. In response, and at a period of heightened 
systemic stress, the BNB has “frontloaded” capital buffers so that the 
capital conservation buffer and the systemic risk buffer are both 
currently in force. The advent of the CRR and its implementing 
technical standards has also removed the BNB’s former power to set 
supervisory provisions against problem exposures. The BNB retains, 
however, the power to set higher capital requirements in respect of 
problem assets. At present the BNB is practicing close monitoring of 
the evolution of the relevant portfolios and is exercising what might 
be termed an “informal Pillar 2 approach.” The BNB does, however, 
need to be ready and able to apply additional capital requirements 
through Pillar 2 in future.6  
 
In implementation of EU law, Bulgaria introduces the reforms 
undertaken in the EU, as regards the explicit consideration for the 
financial sector responsibility for sharing the losses by establishing a 
new regime for recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms. The reform in the EU has to achieve in an 
accelerated mode the results similar to normal insolvency proceedings 
regarding the allocation of losses to shareholders and creditors, but 
improved management with a view to preserving financial stability 
                                           
6 Capital adequacy has been calculated under the EU Capital Requirements 
Regulation since January 2014, which permits a slightly more generous treatment 
for some risk weights than the previous BNB regime. As of December 2014, the 
system CAR stood at 22 percent, and the Tier 1 capital ratio was 19.9 percentIn 
Bulgaria, the majority of tier 1 is held in common equity and the system wide  ratio 
was 19.5 percent. With the advent of the CRR, the BNB can no longer apply a 
minimum 12 percent CAR as it had formerly done. The BNB has however, imposed 
the capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent since May 2014 and has also applied a 
capital buffer for systemic risk of 3 percent of total risk weighted exposures located 
within the country and calculated in accordance to Article 92 (3) of Regulation 
575/2013/EC. 
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and limit losses to taxpayers when the announcement of the bank/firm 
in bankruptcy would threaten the public interest and would constitute 
a threat to financial stability. 
 
For this purpose, the transposition in the Bulgarian legislation of 
Directive 2014/59/EC by a special law creates legal prerequisites for a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms. The Directive aims to establish an effective 
framework at European level to deal with banking crises enough at 
early stage, so as to prevent the spread of the financial problems of 
individual credit institutions on the entire banking system, and to 
eliminate in as much need to use 
 
At the present stage there are further changes in the regulatory 
framework which the banking system in Bulgaria will undergo to 
implement the new European regulations,standards and practices. 
 
In 2015 the BNB as Central Bank declared its readiness to review the 
quality of assets in all banks operating in Bulgaria. This review will be 
a key requirement if the government initiates a negotiating process 
with the ECB to join the single supervisory mechanism. The 
methodology of the review will be built on the highest standards 
already developed and implemented by the ECB in 2014 in reviewing 
the quality of the assets of the largest banks in the euro area. The 
launch of the process will be a function of the progress and 
implementation of the new Directive on recovery and resolution of 
banks. 
 
Agenda priority for 2015 has been to restore confidence in the BNB as 
Central  Bank and in the institutional order that ensures the stability of 
the banking system. Not only the election of the Governor of the 
National Bank, but the implementation of comprehensive reforms in 
the financial intermediation are undertaken to ensure the sustainability 
of financial intermediation and its significant role in the economic 
development of Bulgaria. 
 
The banks and investment firms are setting new the requests for the 
preparation and updating recovery plans containing measures and 
procedures for: 1) taking early action in case of worsening of their 
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financial situation; 2) preparing the development and restructuring 
plans for the restructuring of a bank or investment firm; 3) compliance 
of the plans with the requirement to minimize losses to taxpayers and 
preserve critical core activity of the institution functions. 
 
The expected establishment of a Fund for the restructuring of banks 
(which will be managed by the Board of the Fund for Guaranteeing 
Bank Deposits) and Restructuring Fund investment intermediaries 
(which will be managed by the Board of the Fund for Compensation 
of Investors) builds the necessary institutional structure in Bulgaria for 
conducting modern reforms in EU financial sector. In accordance with 
the requirements of the Directive, the Bulgarian Law on Resolution 
and Restructuring of Credit Institutions and Investment Intermediaries 
previews the following tools of restructuring: sale of business, 
bridging institution, separation of assets and sharing of losses. Two 
additional tools for restructuring are introduced: a tool for government 
capital support and tool for temporary state ownership, which are state 
tools for financial stabilization. Competent authority for deciding on 
the application of these instruments is the Council of Ministers on a 
proposal of the Minister of Finance.  
 
The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) has encountered difficulties with 
the banking crisis in 2014 but its actions have helped to ensure 
financial stability in the banking sector. The crisis began in June 2014 
with two bank failures – the KTB and Viktoria Bank. Following runs 
on deposits, the BNB put the two banks into conservatorship. Soon 
after this intervention, a third domestic bank suffered a depositor run 
and was supported by emergency liquidity (state aid has been 
approved by the EC and provided successfully). The KTB crisis 
clearly demonstrated the lack of an institutional framework for crisis 
management, both in terms of a strengthened preventive role of 
banking supervision and for regulating the bank resolution processes.  
 
With entry into force of the Law on Recovery and Resolution of 
Credit Institutions and Investment Firms in 2015, a regulatory 
framework governing such processes was established. The relevant 
organisational structures should be established for the resolution 
activities and drawing up of operational procedures for interaction 
with the Banking Supervision Department. The BNB has actively 
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monitored and tried so far to mitigate the impact of the global 
financial crisis. Actions taken to increase banks’ capital and liquidity 
cushion include releasing existing prudential “buffers”, for example 
by lowering the reserve requirements and working with parent banks 
to ensure credit lines to foreign-owned subsidiaries remained available 
and profits are recapitalized. The BNB intensified its monitoring, 
strengthened stress testing capabilities and reviewed the crisis 
management framework as a contingency measure. 
 
According to an independent external assessment of the effectiveness 
of the banking supervision in Bulgaria by a joint IMF – World Bank 
team in 2015 important findings and recommendations on the BNB 
banking supervision activities are made.The  IMF and the World bank 
assessment  indicate some issues of the insufficient degree of 
conformity of Bulgaria’s supervisory practices with the Basel 
principles and point out how to improve the banking 
supervision.(IMF,WB, 2015). 
 
In accordance with the Law on Resolution and Restructuring of Credit 
Institutions and Investment Intermediaries that was adopted in 2015 
the BNB is granted a mandate to organize the Asset Quality Review of 
the banking system, including the check of the quality and the 
adequacy of the estimations used for the assets’ valuations, collateral 
and the practices for devaluation and provisioning as instruments 





The main macroeconomic challenges to Bulgaria are: (i) how to 
sustain high GDP growth, and how to ensure that this growth 
translates into new employment opportunities. Success in both 
dimensions will depend on the country's ability to implement the 
                                           
7 The review is going to be done in 2016 in direct cooperation with the European 
Commission and the European Banking Authority and it is going to be based on the 
methodology corresponding to the one that has been already applied by the 
European Central Bank at the start of the European Supervisory Mechanism in the 
euro area in 2014. 
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necessary structural reforms. The implementation of the requirements 
for the EMU entry at the present stage of its new design as EMU 2.0 
may be demanding higher costs before being admitted to the full 
membership. But it is much more rational to get on track of 
preparation for the EMU entry at a time when the reforms in the EMU 
are to be introduced. The adoption of the euro may take place in 
Bulgaria after several measures are fulfilled: 
 under the auspices of the BNB there is a need to carry out the 
Asset Quality Review and the stress test of the Bulgarian 
banking system, 
 an in-depth evaluation of the financial sector of Bulgaria by the 
IMF Financial Stability Assessment Program (FSAP) and the 
World Bank is to be carried out by the end of 2016, 
 an analysis of the necessary steps for the realization of the 
strategic goals is to be reported to all responsible institutions in 
order that decision be taken for Bulgaria’s EMU entry; 
 
The accession to the euro area has been a strategic goal for Bulgaria 
for more than a decade but since mid 2015 it has entered the stage of 
undertaking operationally planned activities to make the right choice 
and engage resourceful means to achieve full integration to the 
European supervisory and financial architecture. Bulgaria has become 
involved in the institutional reform process in favour of further 
deepening the integration in the EU but the reforms tend to raise the 
transitional costs of joining the new instititutional architecture of the 
EU integration. 
 
The EMU has gone through a difficult but useful period of analysing 
the flaws in its original design, and has taken major steps to repair 
them. The new regulation contains tougher rules for fiscal policies, 
stronger oversight of macroeconomic imbalances, and a lender of last 
resort for sovereigns in the form of the European Stability 
Mechanism.The crisis has pushed the changes for the better to design 
prospective reforms by focusing on ensuring financial stability and in 
pursuing financial integration. The newly designed institutions and 
rules raise higher the requirements to comply with the EMU 
governance principles and institutions. The Single Market of the EU 
will be changing as the differentiated integration within the EMU 
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proceeds further. Beyond this, it is equally crucial that the reforms 
will contribute to a more effective and robust functioning of EMU. In 
summarizing the main trends influencing Bulgaria’s integration, we 
have to consider that the EU integration process could not generate 
higher centripetal force for improving the chances of development of 
EMU as a "core" of the EU and thus making the enlargement of the 
EMU to be driven by support to the “catching-up” development of the 
new member states from Central and Eastern Europe like Bulgaria. At 
the present stage the EU faces challenges to implement a 
comprehensive programme to consolidate the Economic and 
Monetary Union by overcoming the impact of the Global and 
European crises. By choosing priorities for further deepening of 
integration in the EMU through completion of the Banking and 
Capital Union and completing the further development of the Single 
Internal Market European Union’s leadership has laid the focus on 
policies to boost growth and implementation of the new "Road Map to 
build true economic and Monetary Union". 
 
In the context of the ongoing difficulties in the Eurozone and the EU 
as a whole out of the economic depression and overcoming the 
financial crisis, the medium-term prospects for restoring economic 
growth remain too controversial at this stage. Delayed recovery of 
economic growth in the EU inevitably has an adverse effect on the 
Bulgarian economy for which the external environment and European 
integration dependencies do not provide positive incentives for post-
crisis development, but much rather determine the necessity of 
rethinking the alternatives to stimulate the national economy by 
domestic demand and economic co-operation and trade with all 
partner countries. 
  
As major problems facing the prospects for economic growth in the 
EMU and implications for Bulgaria can be viewed the following 
structural aspects: 
 the challenges facing Bulgaria in relation to structural reforms 
in the EU post-crisis are determined by the development of the 
integration concept for Europe of "two speeds". Economic 
growth in the EU has sustained lower rates. Unemployment 
reached high levels that determine profound changes in social 
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policy of nation states towards the erosion of the European 
social model.  
 In managing the debt crisis in the Eurozone the EU as a whole 
has run into a round of complex but relatively slow changes in 
the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies.In this sense, the 
transition to long-term investment and growth as a priority for 
economic governance in the EU is crucial for Bulgaria. The 
question remains topical whether and how the Eurozone as the 
core of the integration process will be able to avoid the risk to 
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